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In 1981, in my Animal Right~ an~ HI.lllBJl
Morality, [1] I gained the perhaps dubious
distinction of attempting to rouse the Aris
totelian concept of teJ.:os from the dogmatic
slumber in which it had long lain, attended
to only by Scholastic philosophers.
It ap
pearedto me (and still does) that the notion
of telos provides a sound basis from which to
deduce the rights of animals of different
species, even as human rights have been based
in plausible hypotheses about hl.lllBJl nature.
In so far as different kinds of animals are
built in different sorts of ways for differ
ent sorts of things and in so far as these
differences are rooted in biological, gene
tically based,
empirically ascertainable,
environmentally expressed "blueprints," I saw
nothing problematic about the concept of
telos that would not also trouble both the
ordinary and the scientific notions of spe
cies, or perhaps, sub-species, depending upon
what one takes as a basic unit of classifica
tion.
Both cOIllllOn sense and mcx:1ern biology,
after all, note that "fish gotta swim and
birds gotta fly," as Professor Harlan Miller
put it in reviewing my book. Furthenrore, as
I argued later, once one had leaped positiv
istic and behavioristic hurdles about animal
consciousness, one could generate a notion of
happiness and unhappiness for different sorts
of animals in terms of whether or not they
were in a position to fulfill their telos, or
to engage in those activities whose infringe
ment or thwarting matter most to them. [2]

Engineering of Agricultural Animals in Sep
tember, 1985, at the University of Californ
ia, Davis,[3] I should like briefly to com
ment on what I take to be serious miscon-
structions of the concept, at least as I USE'
it.
'!he scientists, quoted by Dr. Fox, who
see the concept of telos as "mystical" are
seriously in error.
Their view is as much
off the mark and in the same way as those
scientists earlier this century who sought to
eliminate teleological explanation from bio
logy.
Given the mechanistic bias of mcx:1ern
biology, as well as the unfortunate tendency
of many earlier thinkers to equate teleology
with consciously designed purpose and this
with Divine Plan, one can understand such
reservations. After all, the suggestion that
lakes freeze from the top down in order to
protect the fish is indeed mystical, reli
gious ideology. On the other hand, those who
deny that adrenalin is released in order to
alert the body to fight or flight, or that
the immune system exists to fight infection,
or that there is a pigness to a pig and a
dogness to a dog bespeak a mischievous, reli
giously overzealous ideology of their own,
equally absurd and dogmatic.
Scientists and
philosophers like Sommerhoff, Wiener, Braith
waite, and Nagel have shown long ago that
there is nothing inherently problematic about
teleological explanations,
and biological
sciences as diverse as taxonomy, ethology,
evolutionary theory,
veterinary medicine,
genetics, and so on have presupposed the
existence of kinds of animals.
To deny ar-

It is perhaps not surprising, though
certainly disappointing, that this concept
should be radically misunderstood by signifi
cant segments of both sides of the debate on
genetic engineering of agricultural animals.
While my own position on the relevance of
telos to genetic engineering is laid out
fully in
a forthcoming article, a version
of which I gave as a keynote speech to the
First International Conference on Genetic
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especially if the animals falling under the
new type are less likely to suffer.
Given
the rules of chess, one cannot nove the cast
le diagonally; that tells us nothing about
whether we ought to invent a new game with a
new set of rules in which one can so nove.

ticulatable, discoverable, common features
among pigs or dogs is surely not good sci
ence; in fact, taking such a claim seriously
would effectively make all of the above sci
ences impossible~
If we keep fish but not
mice in bowls of water, if we heep manure on
our plants but not on our cats to help them
. grow, if we walk our dogs but not our lichen,
we have presupposed differences in telos.
None of this is mystical nor requires invok
ing the Deity; evolution will do.

On the other hand, critics like Fox do
have a powerful point •
Given the human pur
poses of productivity and efficiency to which
genetic engineering (or telos changing) of
animals is likely to be aimed, in all proba
bility, such changes in telos are unlikely to
make the animals better off.
Scientists
attempting to engineer oversized animals like
chickens are already reporting joint prob
lems, since the joint carmot bear the addi-'
tional weight.
Thus, the engineering of
telos for increased size is likely to lead to

On the other hand, when Fox asks,
"Is
not the unique genetic make-up· of species-
their telos--to be respected and worthy of
noral consideration?", he is guilty of a
serious ambiguity with great potential· for
mischief.
In my own writing on animal
rights, I have argued that given an animal's
telos, it is prima facie wrong to infringe
upon it.
Critics of genetic engineering,
however, sometimes suggest that the telos
itself ·is inviolable, that it is wrong to
change it, rather than violate the fundamen
tal animal interests which constitute it.
This surely cannot be correct.
Suppose that
one can change a telos, Tl, by breeding,
natural selection, genetic engineering, or
whatever to T2, so that animals which have
the new telos are less prone than their pre
decessors to certain diseases or injuries or
predators.
To take a fanciful example, sup
pose that one changed the genome of a grazing
animal forced to live in a limited forage
environment, so that it could now photosyn
thesize its food as well as graze.
Unknown
environmental considerations aside, and as
suming this change had no harmful or painful
effects on the animal, surely such a change
would not in and of itself be wrong.
On my
view, then, it is only wrong to change a
telos i f the individual animals of that sort
are likely to be nore unhappy or suffer nore
after the change than before.

a new sort of suffering, which would probably
be of little concern to producers as long as
it didn't impair efficiency. In other words,
if the increasing weight gain economically
outweighed the economic effects (if any) of
painful joints, it is likely that this perni
cious result to the animal would be ignored.
Thus, given the economic basis of animal
engineering, it is plausible that one whose
concern is the happiness of .animals should
show healthy skepticism about such te10s
manipulation, for in fact, it is probably
likely to generate nore harm than good for
the animals. But this is very different from
saying that changing telos is in principle
wrong.
Indeed, if public awareness of and
distress over the suffering of animals con
tinues to grow, it is very possible that
modification of telos could turn into a p0w
erful tool for alleviating that suffering,
rather than just a short cut to further ex
ploitation.
For example, one could concen
trate on engineering animals which are happy
in the environments in which we put them.
Notes

In Short,
then, one cannot argue that
because it is wrong to violate the various
aspects of a certain animal's telos given the
telos, it is therefore wrong to change the
telos.
This is true only i f the change in
the telos is likely to engender nore unhappi
ness in the animals, given the environment in
which they live, than would have accrued to
them before.
What respect for telos does is
give us a way of measuring the rightness or
wrongness of our actions vis ~ vis the indi
vidual animals falling under the telos; it
does not tell us that we cannot change the
characteristics of the type in question,
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